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AN ANALYSIS FOR THE CHILEAN ECONOMY
Roberto Duncan
Economista
Gerencia de Investigación Económica
Banco Central de Chile
Resumen
Este artículo compara la volatilidad de las principales variables macroeconómicas de una economía
abierta y pequeña en dos contextos: un esquema de dolarización oficial (DO) y un régimen de tipo de
cambio flexible (TCF). Un simple modelo dinámico, estocástico y de equilibrio general es calibrado
para la economía chilena y usado como laboratorio para estudiar las implicaciones de estos regímenes
en las desviaciones estándares de variables claves. Implicaciones de bienestar son también analizadas
desde el punto de vista de un banco central que le preocupa la volatilidad del producto y la inflación.
Los resultados muestran que la DO implica:  mayor volatilidad real debido a la ausencia de una
política monetaria contracíclica;  menor volatilidad de la inflación como resultado de una menor
volatilidad de la tasa de interés extranjera; y, que el régimen del TCF domine a la DO, cuando el
banco central pondera significativamente las desviaciones de la inflación y del producto de sus
respectivos estados estacionarios. Además,  la DO implica tanto una mayor volatilidad del déficit
fiscal debido a una recaudación tributaria más volátil; como una mayor reacción del producto ante
shocks de términos de intercambio.
Abstract
This paper contrasts the volatility of the main macroeconomic variables of a small open economy in
two environments: an official dollarization (OD) scheme and a flexible exchange regime (FER). A
simple DSGE model calibrated for the Chilean economy is used as a laboratory to study the
implications of these regimes on the standard deviations of key variables. Welfare implications are
also analyzed for a central bank that it is concerned with output and inflation volatility. Our findings
show that OD results in: higher real volatility due to the absence of countercyclical monetary policy;
lower inflation volatility because of a less volatile foreign interest rate; and, from a welfare
perspective, OD is dominated by a FER when the central bank weighs considerably the deviations of
inflation and output from the steady state. Also, OD implies higher fiscal deficit volatility as a
consequence of higher tax revenue volatility, and a higher reaction to terms-of-trade shocks.
_________________
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1. Introduction
Full or official dollarization (OD), defined as one country’s official adoption of the
currency of another for all commercial and financial transactions, has been broadly
discussed in recent years, especially after the latest international crises and the advent of the
euro. In fact, some countries have adopted this regime, such as Ecuador and El Salvador,
1
and the possibility of adopting it has been raised in others, including Mexico, Argentina,
Peru, and Central American countries. On the other hand, however, some central banks
have opted for the other extreme, that is, a flexible exchange rate. That is the case of Chile
and other emerging economies. Therefore, it seems advisable to analyze the advantages of
both alternatives in a context of external shocks as those of the last years.
According to the literature, OD has important implications on the main
macroeconomic variables and on fiscal and monetary management. Nevertheless, there is
not a general agreement on the benefits and costs of OD (table 1). Probably, the only
exception is a lower inflation rate.
2 Other benefits found in the literature are: fiscal
discipline;
3 lower devaluation risk and, consequently, lower interest rates;
4 deeper financial
integration;
5 lower transaction costs and less risk in trade;
6 and higher investment and
growth.
7 On the other hand, the most important costs are: loss of seigniorage;
8 elimination
of monetary or exchange rate policy (or loss of the exchange rate as an instrument to
ameliorate external shocks);
9 and loss of the lender of last resort.
10
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Besides, there are a few studies that analyze theoretically the effects of adopting OD
in Latin America. So far as I know, the exceptions are Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and
                                                          
1 Not to mention Panama, an economy that has been fully dollarized for nearly a century.
2 Goldfajn and Olivares, 2000; Dornbusch, 2000; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Edwards and Magendzo, 2001.
3 Savastano, 1999; Chang, 2000.
4 Calvo, 1999a,b; Schuler, 1999; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Chang, 2000.
5 Calvo, 1999a,b; Schuler, 1999; Hausmann, 1999; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Panizza et al., 2000;
Mendoza; 2000, 2002.
6 Panizza et al., 2000; Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000.
7 Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Lizano 2000; Mendoza, 2002.
8 Savastano, 1999; Mendoza, 2002; Berg and Borensztein, 2000.
9 Rojas-Suárez, 1999; Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Mendoza, 2002; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001a; Cooley
and Quadrini, 1999.
10 Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Gale and Vives, 2002.2
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a) for the case of Mexico, Ghironi and Rebucci (2002) for
Argentina, and Duncan (2003) for Peru. Therefore, this work seeks to assess the possible
implications of an OD scheme on the volatility of the main macroeconomic variables of the
Chilean economy. A simple stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model is used as
laboratory to study these issues. Two regimes are analyzed and simulated for a small open
economy that faces external (via terms of trade) and domestic (via technological and fiscal
and monetary policy) shocks. The first regime is a floating exchange rate, and the second is
the full dollarization of the economy. Simulation exercises are performed to compare the
behavior of key variables (such as output, inflation rate, and fiscal deficit) in both
environments and their welfare implications for a central bank that is concerned with output
and inflation deviations from steady-state equilibria.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with two alternative exchange rate regimes: floating and OD.
Section 3 describes their parameterization, solution, main findings, and next steps for future
research. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Households
Consider an economy that is inhabited by an infinitely-lived representative agent that
optimizes an utility function that depends positively on real private consumption ct, real
domestic money balances mt, and leisure lt:
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where 0<β<1 is the subjective discount factor and E{.} is the expectation operator.
The representative household’s constraint is:3
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where  it denotes real investment in period t,  bt is the real stock of assets in domestic
currency, b*t is the real stock of assets in foreign currency, τ  is the (constant) income tax,
wt is real wage, Lt is the level of employment, rt is the real cost of capital, Kt is the stock of
physical capital that follows a typical (deterministic) law of motion (see details in appendix
A), qt is the exogenous relative price of exportable goods to importable goods, or the terms of
trade, Tt denotes real lump-sum transfers, πt is the inflation rate, Ψ(πt) is the cost of price
adjustment,
11 et is the nominal depreciation rate, Rt is the domestic (net) interest rate, R
*
t is
the foreign (net) interest rate,
12 and Dt are firm profits (see appendix A for the detail of the
laws of motion.)
I assume the household to be endowed each period with one unit of time, which is
divided between leisure (1-Lt) and work (Lt). As mentioned before, the function Ψ(πt)
measures the cost of altering prices, and thus represents the degree of price rigidity. It is
assumed to be strictly convex in the inflation rate, and it is zero in steady-state equilibrium.
Particularly, I assume that Ψ(πt)= (ρi/2)(πt-πss)
2, and that there are two goods produced in the
economy. The first good (y1, or importable good) is produced domestically and can be
imported, but the second (y2, or exportable good) is not consumed domestically and is
constant.
For simplicity, I assume that the utility function depends on the logs of consumption,
money balances, and employment:
( ) ( ). 1 log log log , , t t t t t t L m c l m c u − + + = η φ (3)
                                                          
11 Similar to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a).
12 In this theoretical framework, the foreign interest rate is defined as the interest rate that US-dollar deposits
yield in the domestic banking system, which can be different from the international interest rate.4
Firms
On the other hand, the representative firm maximizes its profits given by equation (4),
t t t t t t K r L w y D − − =                                  (4)
subject to a returns-to-scale technology:
() , 1 0 , 0 ; , , 0
1
0 1 < < > = =
− α
α α A e L K A z L K F y
zt
t t t t t t                       (5)
where zt is a technological shock that follows an autoregressive process (see appendix 1 for
details).
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The model considers two alternative monetary policies: (i) flexible exchange rate
with an interest rule, and (ii) OD which will be modeled as a fully credible currency board
where depreciation is zero. So, in the first case, I suppose the following autoregressive
interest rate rule:
() ( ) ( ) ; 1 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 + + + + − + − + − = Rt t ss t ss t t R y y R R ε θ θ π π θ θ                       (6a)
where yt denotes current total output, yss is total output in steady state, and R0 is the long-run
(or steady-state) domestic interest rate. The parameters θj are all positive constants, for j=1,2,3.
Specifically, a positive θ2 denotes that the central bank follows a countercyclical monetary
policy. In this case, exchange rate is endogenous.
In the second case, similar as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a), OD implies:
0 , 0 ≥ ∀ = t et           (6b)
In this context, the interest rate becomes an endogenous variable.5
On the other hand, the government budget constraint is:
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where  gt is the exogenous government spending (see appendix A). The government is
assumed to finance its deficit (government spending net of tax revenues) through
seigniorage, bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency, and US dollars from the
central bank (international reserves).
13
External Environment
To finalize the description of the economy, I assume exogenous terms of trade and
foreign interest rate (see appendix A). To perform a fair comparison I will assume the same
deterministic steady-state equilibrium in both monetary regimes (see appendix B for the
steady-state equilibrium of the model).
The agent’s problem consists of maximizing utility in (1) subject to equations (2)-(5),
(7), the laws of motion presented in appendix A (equations 8-13), and the monetary regime (6a
for floating or 6b for OD). Based on this problem, first-order conditions are obtained
(appendix B, equations 14-22). The solution of the model is achieved around the steady-state
equilibrium (appendix C, expressions 23-31).
3. Calibration and Results
To solve the model we need the values of the parameters. This section describes briefly the
method solution, parameterization, and the main results obtained in terms of the series’
volatilities and welfare implications.
                                                          
13 The assumption is that the central bank has enough international reserves to satisfy demand for US-dollar
money whenever necessary.6
3.1. Method of Solution and Parameterization
The model is solved using a perturbation method developed by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2001). This method consists of a first-order approximation to the policy functions of
the dynamic equilibrium model. Once the models were solved, series of 5,000 observations
were generated in each monetary regime to allow a comparative analysis. To perform an
appropriate comparison I calibrate the model to achieve the same steady-state values for the
variables under both regimes.
I assume three criteria to assign values to each parameter of the models. The first
criterion is to use some of the standard parameter values given in earlier literature, especially
for the Chilean economy (table 2). There are several works that attempt to calibrate dynamic
equilibrium models for Chilean data. Table 3 summarizes the (monthly) parameter values and
their corresponding criterion of choice.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
<Insert Table 3 about here>
The second criterion is to find the parameter value necessary to match some steady-
state values for the Chilean economy (such as steady-state consumption as a percentage of
GDP, the steady-state inflation rate, and so on). The last criterion is to adjust the parameter
values to allow the model to match the volatilities of real output and inflation.
3.2. Main Results
   In this section, I use the simulated variables from the economy with flexible
exchange rate and the fully dollarized economy to compare the performance of the OD
scheme in terms of macroeconomic volatility.
Real and Nominal Volatility
The fully dollarized economy generates higher real volatility expressed in higher
standard deviations or variation coefficients of output series. Particularly, the standard
deviation of output increases around 8.5% (of the one from the flexible exchange regime)7
(table 4). This finding is associated with the absence of the (countercyclical) monetary
policy that can be endogenously used in the floating regime to mitigate real shocks. The
lack of this instrument in the fully dollarized economy could be causing the higher real
volatility.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
To confirm the results, I also tested for equality of variances between series under
both regimes, the null of equality is rejected verifying that OD means (statiscally
significant) higher real volatility but lower inflation volatility.
14
Other Implications: Fiscal Deficit Volatility and Reaction to External Shocks
Some authors have stated that OD implies higher fiscal discipline (table 1). Although it
is quite difficult to measure fiscal discipline in this case, I will try to approximate it through
the volatility (standard deviation) of the public deficit. The estimation of this statistic for both
models indicates that the regime with flexible exchange rate causes a slightly lower volatility
on the fiscal position than does full dollarization (table 4).
15 That is, “fiscal discipline” can be
higher in a flexible exchange rate regime than in a fully dollarized economy. This result can be
explained by the fact that output is more volatile and so are income-tax revenues.
On the other hand, it has been also contended that OD implies higher output
responses to external shocks, such as terms-of-trade fluctuations. Figure 1 shows the
impulse-response function of a (-10%) terms-of-trade shock on output in both regimes. It
can be seen that the output response is higher for the full dollarization regime than the
floating regime. That is, the lack of domestic monetary policy (and, perhaps, nominal
exchange rate) in a fully dollarized economy implies that terms-of-trade shocks cause
higher output reactions when compared to the output response from an economy with
flexible exchange rate. This finding contradicts Calvos’ (1999a,b) argument that instead of
nominal exchange rate, prices and wages would adjust to terms-of-trade shocks in a fully
dollarized economy.
                                                          
14 The results of the test are available upon request.
15 This fact was also verified through the calculation of tests for equality of variances. The null of equality
between fiscal deficit variances from each regime is rejected at conventional levels of significance.8
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
A Welfare Comparison
In order to evaluate the welfare implications of these alternative regimes, I will use
a simple welfare criterion. I will assume that the central bank seeks to minimize an
expected social loss function. This function takes the form:








t t y y L π π χ χ − + − =           (32)
Taking unconditional expectations, the loss function becomes:
[] () () t t t Var y Var L E π χ χ 2 1 + =                      (33)
where Var(y) and Var(π) are the unconditional variances of domestic output and
inflation, respectively. In particular, following Parrado and Velasco (2002), I begin
assuming that the parameters χ1 and χ2 take the values 0.5 and 1.5, respectively. As can be
seen in table 6, the flexible exchange rate regime dominates OD in all the cases, except
when the parameters are very low, that is, when the central bank does not weigh the
deviations from steady-state output and inflation significantly. However, these results must
be taken carefully because the comparison might be sensitive to the degree of cyclicality of
the monetary policy.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis and Future Research
The results are virtually insensitive to changes in parameter values such as the ones
related to consumers’ preferences and firms’ technology. Further analysis can be done
considering other utility function specifications. However, results are sensitive to the nature
of monetary policy. The countercyclical monetary policy−expressed in an interest rule that
depends positively on output deviation from steady state—plays a key role. A less9
countercyclical monetary policy produces less difference on output and inflation volatility
between both regimes
16.
Therefore, in an economy with price rigidities (and flexible exchange rate), OD
implies higher real volatility due to the loss of a countercyclical monetary policy.
17 On the
other hand, in an economy with price flexibility, full dollarization does not increase real
volatility. Even in this case, the absence of monetary policy shocks could imply lower
standard deviation of real output since a source of volatility is eliminated in the economy.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to assess the possible implications of an OD scheme on the
volatility of the main macroeconomic variables of the Chilean economy. I use a simple
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model as laboratory to study these issues. Two
regimes are formulated and simulated for a small open economy that faces external and
domestic shocks. The first environment represents an economy with floating exchange rate,
and the second represents a fully dollarized economy. Simulation exercises are performed
and their welfare implications are analyzed for a central bank that is concerned with output
and inflation deviations from steady state.
The results show, first, that OD implies higher real volatility due to the absence of
countercyclical monetary policy in an economy with price rigidities. Second, in contrast,
OD generates less inflation volatility because of a less volatile foreign interest rate. Third,
from a welfare perspective, OD is dominated by a FER when the central bank weighs
significantly the deviations of inflation and output from the steady state. Fourth, a
conclusion related to the first one is that OD implies higher fiscal deficit volatility as a
consequence of higher tax revenue volatility. Finally, OD produces a higher reaction to
                                                          
16 Alesina and Barro (2001) also contend this idea.
17 I also performed a sensitivity analysis considering different degrees of price stickiness (ρi). As long as the
degree of price stickiness reduces, the difference between output volatility from the flexible exchange rate
regime and the one from the fully dollarized regime becomes lower. In the extreme case when ρi is zero, the
difference approaches zero. This result signals the crucial role of price stickiness.10
terms-of-trade shocks, since there is not the possibility of performing countercyclical
monetary policy in that context.11
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() , 1 1 t t t i K K + − = + δ (8)
( ) qt t q q t q q q ε ρ ρ + + − = −1 0 1  (9)
() ( ) ( ) ; 1 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 + + + + − + − + − = Rt t ss t ss t t R y y R R ε θ θ π π θ θ           (10)
() ; 1 *
* * *
1 t R t R o R t R R R ε ρ ρ + + − = +           (11)
, 1 zt t z t z z ε ρ + = −                       (12)
( ) ; 1 1 0 gt t g g t g g g ε ρ ρ + + − = −                      (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate, εjt is a zero-mean shock with variance σ
2
j, for all j = q, R, R
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Firms
Firms maximize (14) subject to (15)-(16), obtaining the typical first-order conditions:
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Economy
() . 2 1 y q y g i c t t t t t t + = Ψ + + + π             (22)
                                                          
18 For simplicity, I assume the logarithm of the liquidity services function.18
Appendix C
Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady state, the laws of motion (5), (6), (7), (17), and (21) imply the steady-state
value of terms of trade, the interest rate denominated in domestic currency, the interest rate
denominated in foreign currency, a technological shock, and government spending,
respectively:
0 q qss =           (23)
0 R Rss =           (24)
*
0
* R Rss =           (25)
0 = ss z           (26)
0 g gss =           (27)
Substituting condition (24) in (17), the steady-state inflation rate is obtained:
() 1 1 − + = ss ss R β π ,                      (28)
Using condition (18) and expressions (25) and (28), the steady-state rate of















,                      (29)
Equations (3), (14), (16), (19), (20) and (22) yields:
() 2 1 1 3










































) 1 ( ) 1 (
;
1 1
) 1 ( A A
Using expression (30) and equations (14) and (15), and rearranging, an expression
for the steady-state consumption that depends on the steady-state employment is obtained:
), 1 ( 3 1 ss ss L c − = ω ω                      (31)
Similarly, the steady-state stock of capital can be found with the same equations:
, 2 ss ss L K ω =           (32)
With equations (30) and (32) the steady-state total production is derived. Finally,














φ                                  (33)
The steady-state values of the variables in the fully dollarized model are the same as
the ones in the model with flexible exchange rate. The only differences are that in the
former the depreciation rate is zero and the domestic interest rate is endogenous.20
Table 1a. Benefits of Official Dollarization
Benefits In favor Against
Lower Inflation
Savastano (1999), Goldfajn and Olivares
(2000), Dornbusch (2000), Berg and
Borensztein (2000), Edwards and Magendzo
(2001)
Fiscal Discipline Savastano (1999), Chang (2000) Goldfajn and Olivares
(2000), Edwards (2001a,b)
Lower Devaluation Risk and
Interest Rates
Calvo (1999a,b), Schuler (1999),
Berg and Borensztein (2000), Chang (2000),





Quispe (2002), Carrera et
al. (2002)
Deeper Financial Integration
Calvo (1999a,b) Schuler (1999),
Hausmann (1999), Berg and Borensztein





Lower transaction costs and less
risk in trade




Higher Investment and Growth Savastano (1999)(?), Berg and Borensztein
(2000), Lizano (2000), Mendoza (2002)
Edwards (2001a,b),
Goldfajn and Olivares
(2000), Drew et al. (2001)
The sign (?) denotes that the author compiles that benefit (or cost) from other author but does not necessarily support it.
Table 1b. Costs of Official Dollarization
Costs In favor Against
Loss of Seigniorage Savastano (1999), Mendoza (2002),
Berg and Borensztein (2000)
Calvo (1999a,b), Dornbusch
(2000), Alesina and Barro
(2001)
Elimination of Monetary or
Exchange Rate Policy
Rojas-Suárez (1999), Berg and
Borensztein (2000), Mendoza (2002),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a),
Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
Calvo (1999a,b)






programs, cash registers, legal and
financial costs of revising contracts
or refinancing




The sign (?) denotes that the author compiles that benefit (or cost) from other author but does not necessarily support it.Table 2. Main Features of DSGE Models Calibrated for the Chilean Economy




agent, 1-good, closed economy.











Objective: To replicate regularities (several sample moments)
Good fit: volatility of output and investment, and first autocorrelation of
investment. Difficulties to replicate: cross correlations and




DSGE factor model. Infinitely-
lived agent, 2-good, small open
economy. Four sectors and cost
of adjustment of labor. Based
on Corbo (1985).
Filter: Not reported







Objective: To replicate empirical regularities of the real exchange rate
(volatility, contemporaneous cross-correlations, and auto-correlations).
Good fit: volatility of output and investment, and contemporaneous
cross-correlation with wages, price of copper and foreign capital





agent, 1-good, closed economy.
Based on Cooley and Hansen
(1989) cash-in-advance model.
Filter: Hodrick and Prescott (1997)








Objective: To replicate regularities (several sample moments) and
assess the role of money in Chilean business cycles.
Good fit: direction of variables except capital stock and money.
Difficulties to replicate: GDP, employment, prices, inflation, and
productivity volatility; phase shift of all variables except consumption,





agent, 2-good, small open
economy. Includes relative
price of investment and income
taxes. Based on Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000).
Filter: Not used
Method of solution: Perturbation
method (second-order approximation)
Metric: Set of VAR coefficients and
impulse-response functions of real GDP.
Annual data,
1960-2000
Objective: To replicate regularities (several impulse-response functions)
and assess the determinants of growth in Chilean economy.
Good fit: response of output to a shock on terms of trade, fiscal
spending as a percentage of GDP (fiscal distortions) and relative price






agent, 2-good, closed, cash-in-
advance economy, with labor
and wage rigidities. Based on
Cooley and Hansen (1989) and
McGrattan (1994).
Filter: Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
Method of solution: Linear quadratic





Objective: To replicate regularities (several sample moments) and
assess the role of monetary and fiscal variables in Chilean business
cycles.
Good fit: prices and output volatility, consumption volatility and its
correlation with output. Difficulties to replicate: correlations: output-
price level (and inflation), hours worked-average productivity.
Correlations of money and other variables not reported.
Notes: DSGE denotes dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, DGE denotes dynamic general equilibrium. 1/ Confidence intervals of the metric are not reported.









NR ... NR 0.999 0.0200 0.0000
McGrattan (1994) US, 1947-1987 0.985 ... 0.397 NC 0.0980 0.0226
Cooley and
Hansen (1995) US, 1954-1991 0.989 ... 0.400 0.950 0.0070 0.0190





0.986 ... 0.400 0.990 0.0178 0.0250
Bergoeing and
others (2001) Chile, 1981-2000 0.980 ... 0.600 NR NR 0.0800
Chumacero and





0.979 ... 0.37-0.4 0.981 0.0990 0.0200
Duncan (2002) Chile, 1986.01-
2000.12
0.996 0.005 0.35 0.9 0.0001 0.09/12
Exportable Sector and Fiscal Policy
Authors Country and
Period of Study ρq σq τ g0 ρg σg
McGrattan (1994) US, 1947-1987 ... ... NP 70.99 NC 0.078
Bergoeing and
others (2001) Chile, 1981-2000 ... ... 0.51-0.12 ... ... ...
Chumacero and





... ... NP 0.089 0.760 0.097
Duncan (2002) Chile, 1986.01-
2000.12
0.961 0.0127 0.25 1.22 0.76 0.008
a. NR denotes “not reported”. NP denotes that it is not considered as parameter in the study. NC means “not
comparable”, since the author(s) did not use an AR(1) process.Table 4. Parameterization of the Model
/a
Parameter Symbol Value Criteria of Choice
Subjective discount factor β 0.996 Calibration of steady-state real interest rate
around 5% (annual)
Utility sensitivity to domestic
money φ 0.05 Duncan (2002)
Utility sensitivity to leisure η 1.2 Calibration of steady-state labor: 0.35. This
value implies a labor day of 8.2 hours.
Capital share α 0.35 Previous literature (0.33-0.4)
Technological constant A0 0.9 Calibration of steady-state share of
consumption on GDP around 70%
Technological-AR1 coefficient ρz 0.9 Duncan (2002)
Technological volatility σz 0.0001 Duncan (2002)
Depreciation rate δ 0.09/12 Calibration of steady-state share of investment
on GDP around 20%
Cost of price adjustment parameter ρi 2 Calibration of output volatility
Steady-state exportable sector Y2 1.5 Calibration of steady-state share of exportable
sector on GDP around 10%
Terms-of-trade-AR1 coefficient ρq 0.961 OLS estimates using Bennett and Valdés
(2001)
Terms-of-trade volatility σq 0.0127 OLS estimates using Bennett and Valdés
(2001)
Income tax τ 0.25 Chumacero and Fuentes (2002)
Steady-state government spending g0 1.4 Calibration of steady-state share of government
spending on GDP: 10-15%
Government-AR1 coefficient ρg 0.76 Duncan (2002)
Government expend. volatility σg 0.008 Duncan (2002)
Foreign interest rate (constant) R*0 1.05
(1/12)-1 Duncan (2002)
AR1 coefficient ρR 0.8 Duncan (2002)
Foreign interest rate volatility σR* 0.0061 Duncan (2002)
Domestic interest rate (constant) R0 1.077
(1/4)-1 Calibration of steady-state annual inflation rate
between 2% and 3%
AR1 coefficient θ1 0.67 Corbo (2002)
Output deviation coefficient θ2 1.46 Corbo (2002)
Output deviation coefficient θ2 0.32 Corbo (2002)
Domestic interest rate volatility σr 0.000068 Calibration of inflation rate volatility.
a. AR(1) denotes first-order autoregression process. All the parameter values are used in both models with the exceptions mentioned in
this table. The covariances of the shocks are assumed to be zero. Data from the Chilean economy were obtained from Central Bank of
Chile, the National Bureau of Statistics, and Bennett and Valdés (2001).Table 5. Statistics of the (simulated) series from the models
Simulated series from
the economy with flexible exchange rate
Simulated series from
the fully dollarized economy
Statistic Output Inflation Fiscal Deficit Output Inflation Fiscal Deficit
Std. Dev. 0.014583395 0.055275331 0.019192821 0.10003337 0.017413171 0.029335713
Coeff. of Var.
/a 0.0035027839 0.054253089 0.053338693 0.024152327 0.017214405 0.080429276
a. The coefficient of variation results dividing the standard deviation by the mean of each series.










0.7 1.7 0.00534299 0.00752014 -0.21771555
0.6 1.6 0.00501618 0.00648915 -0.14729699
0.5 1.5 0.00468938 0.00545817 -0.07687843
0.4 1.4 0.00436258 0.00442718 -0.00645987
0.3 1.3 0.00403577 0.00339619 0.06395869
Figure 1. Responses of Output in Both Regimes to 
a Negative Terms-of-Trade Shock
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